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WILLS AND TRUSTS
I. CONSTRUcTIoN oF WILL
In Sutcliffe v. Laney Bros., Inc.1 the court sought to ascer-
tain the intentions of the testatrix with respect to the dividing
line between two adjacent parcels of real estate. The phrase
"approximately one acre ' 2 was used in both of the two para-
graphs of the will making the two gifts, but the land in ques-
tion, slightly more than two acres, had for some time been
divided by a fence into distinctly unequal parcels neither of
which very closely approximated one acre.
The court decided that it could not be determined from the
will precisely where the testatrix had intended the dividing
line to be, and that the presence of this latent ambiguity made
the admission of surrounding facts and circumstances known
to the testatrix both proper and necessary in the attempt to
determine her intention.3 The court was of the opinion that
the evidence presented in this case showed clearly that the
testatrix thought of the two parcels on either side of the fence
as two entirely distinct tracts of land and, as such, intended to
devise the property as divided by the fence.
In deciding this case the court specifically referred to and
relied on the principles of the factually similar case of Shelley
v. S elley.4 In Shelley the court found, from the presence in
the will of concurrent gifts of various buildings to the same
beneficiaries, an intention on the part of the testator to give
unequal shares to his two beneficiaries. It was apparent to the
court that the dividing line was intended to be drawn in order
to give the property containing certain buildings to one bene-
ficiary and the property containing other specified buildings to
the other beneficiary.;
1. 247 S.C. 417, 147 S.E.2d 689 (1966).
2. Id. at 417, 147 S.E.2d at 690.
3. For South Carolina cases where extrinsic evidence has been admitted to
clarify a latent ambiguity in the instrument, see Note, Admissibility of Tes-
tator's Dcclarations of Intention, 17 S.C.L. REv. 276, 278 & n.12 (1965).
4. 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851 (1964).
5. See Karesh, Wills and Trusts, 1964-1965 Survey of South Carolina
Law, 18 S.C.L. REv. 165, 185 (1965), and Note, 17 S.C.L. Rev. 283-84 (1965)
for a full discussion of the principles enunciated in the Shelley case.
For a case in which the court found an intention to give precisely equal
shares of property see Plummer v. Plummer, 226 S.C. 344, 85 S.E.2d 189
(1954).
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In Morgan v. Merchants & Planters Nat'l Bank,6 perhaps the
most interesting case in this area of the law during the period
under survey, the testatrix left a will of which the following are
the pertinent parts:
Item II. I give and bequeath unto my beloved husband,
B. B. Morgan, the sum of Six Thousand ($6000.00) Dollars
per annum, payable to him in monthly installments of Five
Hundred ($500.00) Dollars each... [and such installments]
shall be paid to my husband by my Executor, hereinafter
named, for and during the term of his natural life. And
this annual income is to be paid to him from income derived
from my income producing properties belonging to my
estate.
Item IV. After the above bequests are carried out in full,
and only then, I give and bequeath Fifty Thousand ($50,-
000.00) Dollars of my estate for [certain specified charities].
. . . Should my estate be insufficient to pay all of the
bequests mentioned in this paragraph or item in full, then
the same shall be prorated by my Executor.
Item V. All the rest and residue of my property . . . is
hereby willed, devised and bequeathed unto my beloved
husband, B. B. Morgan.
Item VI. My Executor, hereinafter named, is requested to
complete the administration of my estate as soon as prac-
ticable, bearing in mind the fact that he cannot make a full
distribution to my beneficiaries named herein until after the
death of my beloved husband, B. B. Morgan, who is to
receive Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars per month income
derived from some of my income producing properties as
long as he shall live as set forth in Item II of this Will.
Item VII. I hereby nominate, constitute and appoint The
Merchants and Planters National Bank of Gaffney, South
Carolina, as my Executor to carry out the provisions of
this my Last Will and Testament; and I do hereby give to
my said Executor full power to collect all debts owing to
me, and to receipt for same; to sell and convey any and all
of my property, personal and mixed, and real estate, at
public or private sale, at such times and upon such terms,
6. 247 S.C. 435, 147 S.E.2d 702 (1966).
1967]
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and in such manner as my Executor may deem mete and
proper; and to cancel mortgages, borrow money or lend
money, sign proxies, transfer stocks and bonds, execute and
deliver to purchasers of any personal or real property good
and sufficient bills of sale, fee simple titles, and general
warranty deeds; and to execute and deliver to the lender to
secure any loan he may obtain in good and sufficient
pledges of personal property, chattel mortgages or real
estate mortgages.
7
On the death of the testatrix the will was probated in common
form, and on demand by the contestant grandniece of the testa-
trix, the will was proved in solemn form. The contestant then
filed an appeal for a de novo hearing in the court of common
pleas, but before the controversy reached trial, a court-approved
settlement was reached. Under this agreement the contestant
received 22,500 dollars, the husband of the testatrix received the
use of the family home until his death, and the executor de-
posited 50,000 dollars in a savings and loan association account
to be paid to the charities specified in the will at the death of
the testatrix's husband.
The husband of the testatrix, B. B. Morgan, brought this
action seeking a declaratory judgment that he is now the sole
beneficiary under the will and, as such, may elect to take his gift
in the residuary clause after rejecting the monthly income
provision created for his benefit by Item II.
The principal issue raised by the case is the intention of the
testatrix with respect to the creation of a spendthrift trust with
her husband as beneficiary. If, as the plaintiff contended, no
trust were created, then the plaintiff's interest in the annuity
and the residuary estate merged and gave him the right to
immediate possession of the remaining assets.8 If an active
trust were created, however, as the defendant contended, the
plaintiff would not be entitled to possession of the residuary
assets.
The South Carolina Supreme Court decided the case in favor
of the plaintiff. In so doing the court said: "There can be no
doubt that these provisions of the will placed the legal and
equitable title to the entire estate in the husband, subject only
to the payment of the charitable bequests."9
7. Id. at 438-39, 147 S.E2d at 703-04.
8. McLarin v. Knox, 6 S.C. 23 (1874).
9. 247 S.C. 435, 441, 147 S.E2d 702, 705 (1966).
[Vol. 19
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It seems at least arguable, however, that there was room for
doubt. The cases of the South Carolina Supreme Court contain
numerous examples of the familiar principle that the duty of
the court in interpreting a will is to attempt to determine the
intention of the testator from the words used in the will.10
From a consideration of the language of the various provisions
of this will it seems quite possible that the intention of the
testatrix was that her husband receive 500 dollars per month for
the rest of his life, that the named charities receive 50,000 dol-
lars if that much remained, and that her husband be allowed to
dispose of any amount still remaining by his will.
Particularly salient is the language of the annuity provision
of Item II: "And this annual income is to be paid to him from
income derived from my income producing properties belonging
to my estate"'" and of the direction in Item VI:
My Executor, hereinafter named, is requested to complete
the administration of my estate as soon as practicable,
bearing in mind the fact that he cannot make a full distri-
bution to the beneficiaries named herein until after the
death of my beloved husband, B. B. Morgan, who is to
receive Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars per month income
derived from some of my income producing properties as
long as he shall live .... 12
Also important, as the defendant contended, were the powers
conferred on the bank by the will. These seem to be particularly
strong indications of the intention of the testatrix to vest legal
title in the bank.
The court quickly disposed of this contention, however, by
saying: "There is expressed in [Item VIII . . . no intent to
affect the legal title to the remainder of the estate clearly
devised to the husband in Item V."'
3
It seems, however, that the important thing is that these
active powers are conferred. The gift in Item V and the absence
of the express intention in Item VII "to affect the legal title
to the remainder of the estate" seems to be rectified by the gen-
eral manifestation of intention apparent from a closer adherance
10. R.g., Shelley v. Shelley, 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851 (1964) ; Montague
v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 233 S.C. 110, 103 S.E2d 769 (1958).
11. 247 S.C. 435, 147 S.E2d 702, 703 (1966). (Emphasis added.)
12. Id. at 438, 147 S.E2d at 704. (Emphasis added.)
13. Id. at 441, 147 S.E2d at 705.
1967]
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to another familiar rule of wills construction-that the inten-
tion of the testator is to be determined from the language of
the will considering the instrument as a whole.
14
With respect to the possibility of finding the intention to
create a trust, the well-established law is that no particular
words or form is essential to the creation of a trust' 5 and that
the person intended to be the trustee may be designated in the
will by other names such as "executor."1 6
The plaintiff in this case did not contend that the testatrix
had been in any way precluded from or incapable of creating
a, trust. He contended only that she had not intended to do so.
But what had she intended to do? The plaintiff and the
court said that the testatrix purposely worded her will as she
had in order to guarantee the plaintiff a certain amount of
money before any gifts were made to charity. But what had the
testatrix tried to guarantee? Had she wished to insure that her
husband receive property sufficient to provide him an annual
income of 6,000 dollars, or had she wished to insure that he
received the annual income itself? It seems plain that her inten-
tion was the latter. She had set up her priorities as follows:
(1) Annual income for her husband.
(2) Gifts to charity.
(3) Residuary estate to husband.
The way to insure her first priority was to recognize the inten-
tion that a trust be created.
II. INTEREST ON LEGAcY-TETA.,ENTAiY GuAxRmN
In Jackson v. ]ValtersT the court followed "the clear weight
of authority in this state"' 8 in deciding that a legacy directed
to be paid over to the plaintiff as the guardian of a minor bore
interest computed from one year after the testatrix's death.
The language in the codicil creating the legacy read as fol-
lows: ".... and direct that it be used for [the minor beneficiarys]
14. E.g., Shelley v. Shelley, 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851 (1964); Mac-
Donald v. Fagan, 118 S.C. 510, 111 S.E. 793 (1922).
15. E.g., Albergotti v. Summers, 203 S.C. 137, 26 S.E.2d 395 (1943).
16. E.g., Angus v. Nobel, 73 Conn. 56, 46 Atl. 278 (1900) (trustee desig-
nated "executor").
17. 246 S.C. 486, 144 S.E.2d 422 (1965).
18. Id. at 494, 144 S.E.2d 425.
5
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. . . education."' 9 The circuit court had interpreted this phrase
to mean "college education" and had decided that the legacy
would not bear interest until such time as the beneficiary should
reach college age.
20
III. WI-,--ICONSISTENT CONTRACT TO DEVISE
In Footma7n v. Sweat2 ' the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed a decree of specific performance22 in favor of one
having an oral contract to devise with a decedent whose will,
executed prior to the making of the contract, was inconsistent
with the contract. In so deciding the court relied on the circuit
court opinion which cited the South Carolina case of MeLauh-
Zia v. Gressette2= for the proposition that the existence of the
will may be considered "as bearing on the improbability of the
existence of a contract inconsistent with its terms."
Actually, however, in McLauchlin the alleged contract to
devise was entered into prior to the execution of the will. 24
In the Footn.n fact situation, where the will was executed
prior to formation of the alleged contract to devise, there seems
to be even more reason for reducing the effect of an inconsistent
will. This seems to be particularly true in a case such as this
where the testatrix made her will four years prior to the alleged
execution of the contract and died only seven months after the
alleged execution.
IV. TRusTEEs-EsToPpEL
Dunn v. Miller25 is an application of well settled equitable
principles to a unique and interesting factual situation.
Several members of the Laws Chapel Church, a member of
the Toe River Association of Free Will Baptist Churches, exe-
19. Id. at 489, 144 S.E.2d 423.
20. The question in this case arose as part of a mortgage controversy
between the plaintiff, acting as both executrix and testamentary guardian,
and the defendant, mother of the minor legatee. See Survey of Property in
this issue.
21. 247 S.C. 172, 146 S.E.2d 624 (1966).
22. See Survey of Contracts in this issue.
23. 224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E2d 149 (1953).
24. For another case where the will vas executed subsequent to the
entrance into an inconsistent contract to devise, see Kerr v. Kennedy, 105
S.C. 496, 90 S.E. 177 (1916).
Apparently Footman v. Sweat is the first South Carolina case where the
issue of a prior executed will is raised.
25. 247 S.C. 567, 148 S.E.2d 676 (1966).
19671
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cuted a deed to a lot owned by and across the street from the
Laws Chapel Church.
The deed was executed to a Reverend Snow, an ordained
Missionary Baptist minister, who had been conducting services
at Laws Chapel in the absence of a regular Free Will Baptist
minister. The grantors of the deed purported to be the trustees
of Laws Chapel Church.
After the construction of a building on the lot, the plaintiffs,
members and trustees of Laws Chapel, learned that the property
no longer belonged to Laws Chapel Church, and that the build-
ing was to be used to house a Missionary Baptist Church called
the Marietta Second Baptist Church.
In this decision the court held that the plaintiffs were not
estopped to deny the validity of the purported deed by their
silence during the construction of the building, when it was
shown that they had believed the new building was going to be
larger quarters for the crowded Laws Chapel congregation and
had no knowledge of the purposes or the actions of the de-
fendants.
V. LEGISLATION-EFFECT OF DIvoRcE ON PRioR DRAWN WImLS
AND CERTAIN FIINGS REQUIRED BY P RSONAL REPRESENTATIVES
The treatment of wills made prior to divorce was dealt with
by the South Carolina General Assembly in Act No. 89626 which
provides:
Any will offered for and admitted to probate, subsequent
to the effective date of this act, made by husband or wife
who have been divorced, a vinculo matrimonii, from each
other subsequent to the date of the will shall be made null
and void by means of the divorce insofar as the will affects
the surviving divorced spouse as beneficiary, trustee, execu-
tor or any other capacity, unless the will shall have been
made in contemplation of such divorce expressed on its
face.27
In passing this legislation, South Carolina joined an increas-
ing number of states which have enacted similar statutes. 28 The
26. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1966, p. 2248, adding § 19-223 to S.C. CoDE ANN.
(1962).
27. Ibid.
28. See Rees, Anerican Wills Statutes: II, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 885 (1960),
for a discussion of similar statutes in other states.
[Vol. 19
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South Carolina act, however, is different from most in two
respects. First, our statute covers provisions in the will affect-
ing the surviving divorced spouse as "trustee, executor or any
other capacity" as well as provisions affecting such spouse as
beneficiary. Second, the South Carolina statute allows an ex-
press statement on the face of the will that it was "made in
contemplation of such divorce" to prevent the nullification.
Act No. 138 29 requires the filing of certain documents by the
personal representative of the decedent in the probate courts
of all counties wherein the decedent owned real estate. With
respect to a testate estate, the act amends section 19-264.1 of the
code80 so as to require such a filing of not only a certified copy
of the will but also a certified copy of the final discharge of the
personal representative.
In the case of an intestate estate the act requires that:
There shall be filed with the judge of probate of every
county of the State wherein the intestate owned real estate,
a certified copy of (a) the petition for letters of adminis-
tration, (b) the order appointing the administrator, and
(c) the final discharge of administrator.31
VI. NE w STATUTE REGARDING PECUNiARY FonmuLA CLAusES
AND OTHE PECUNIARY BEQUESTS3
2
No estate planning problem has received more attention in
recent years than the problem of meeting the requirements of
Revenue Procedure 64-19 a3 to qualify the estate for the estate
tax marital deduction.3 4 The problem arises where the drafts-
man utilizes the following provisions in spelling out the share
of the estate to be used to fund the wife's qualifying share:
(1) a pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust for the wife's share;
(2) a provision that the executor may satisfy bequests by pay-
ment in kind as well as in cash; and (3) a provision that the
executor may use values as finally determined for estate tax
purposes in satisfaction of such bequests. It is important to note
29. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1966, p. 2657.
30. S.C. CoDE: ANN. § 19-264.1 (1962).
31. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1966, p. 2657.
32. This section is written by Charles H. Randall, Jr., Professor of Law,
University of South Carolina.
33. 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682.
34. INT. REv. CODE op 1954, § 2056.
1967]
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 17
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss1/17
SOUTH CAizOLINA LAW REVIEW
that the Revenue Procedure has no application to fractional
share formula clauses. However, it is probably true that the
majority of wills drafted in this state which use the formula
clause marital deduction employ the pecuniary formula clause.3 5
The Revenue Procedure expressed, concern that the fiduciary in
satisfying the bequest might not be required either by the ex-
press or implied provisions of the instrument or by state law to
distribute assets equal in amount to the full marital deduction,
or alternatively to fairly apportion any appreciation or depre-
ciation in the assets between the wife's bequest and other be-
quests. The question seldom provokes litigation in state courts,
so that it is difficult to find authority requiring an executor to
so apportion where the instrument is silent. To settle the ques-
tion, the legislature enacted this year a statute which purports
to be declaratory of present law and which requires that "unless
the governing instrument provides otherwise," the fiduciary
must distribute assets "fairly representative of appreciation or
depreciation in the value of all property thus available for
distribution.13 6 The purpose of this comment is only to call the
new statute to the attention of the bar; the problem is too
complex for brief discussion in this survey.
37
ROBERT L. WyxN, III
35. Bruton, Some Marital Deduction Problems For The South Carolina
Lawyer, 16 S.C.L. REv. 462, 474 (1964).
36. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1966, p. 2265.
37. See generally CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 543-49 (Supp. 1966).
[Vol. 19
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